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 Introduction 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that government could not limit corporate political spending in 
elections arguing that such limitations would violate the free speech rights of 
corporations.  With this ruling, the Court has set a new standard for corporate First 
Amendment rights.   
A corporation does not in and of itself speak to its own causes and interests.  A 
corporation is grounded in the voices and actions of a revolving cast of board of directors 
and shareholders.  By allowing corporations the freedom to use general treasury funds for 
near limitless electoral advocacy, the Court has single handedly rewritten campaign 
finance laws and stare decisis.  As a result, individuals running corporations have been 
given a voice that carries far greater impact than that of their personal electoral voice due 
to the brand power of the corporation and the sizeable source of funds that corporations 
enjoy over that of individuals.  Corporations both foreign and domestic now have the 
ability to influence elections and in effect, public policy at levels previously thought 
unattainable.  The effect of this ruling will have a lasting impact on corporate speech in 
the United States.   
The Citizens United case centers around the nonprofit corporation Citizens United 
and their attempt to distribute a documentary entitled, Hillary: The Movie.  Hillary, 
released in 2008, is a ―ninety-minute documentary about then-Senator and presidential 
candidate Hillary Clinton‖ (Gilpatrick, 2010).  Citizens United intended to ―pay cable 
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companies to make the film available for free through video-on-demand, which allows 
digital cable subscribers to select programming from various menus, including movies‖ 
(―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010).  The documentary was to be released through on-demand 
services within 30 days of presidential primaries (―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010).   
Citizens United‘s position was that the timing of the documentary‘s release would 
be in violation of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) (Gilpatrick, 
2010).  BCRA ―prohibits corporations and labor unions from using their general treasury 
funds to make electioneering communications or for speech that expressly advocates the 
election or defeat of a federal candidate‖ (―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010).  Under BCRA, 
an ―electioneering communication is generally defined as ‗any broadcast, cable or 
satellite communication‘ that is ‗publicly distributed‘ and refers to a clearly identified 
federal candidate and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general 
election‖ (―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010).  As a result, ―Citizens United sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commission in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia, arguing that the ban on corporate electioneering communications at 
2 U.S.C. §441b was unconstitutional as applied to the film and that disclosure and 
disclaimer requirements were unconstitutional as applied to the film and the three ads for 
the movie‖ (―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010).  The preliminary injunction was denied by 
the District Court but they did grant the Commission‘s motion for summary judgment 
(―Court Case Abstracts,‖ 2010).           
Citizens United is a case centered on the corporate restrictions of BCRA.  The 
Supreme Court ruling overturned the 1990 Court case, Austin v. Michigan State Chamber 
of Commerce, where ―[t]he Court affirmed the concept that curbing the capability of the 
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corporate form to expend disproportionate resources to influence elections was a 
sufficiently important government interest to restrict speech‖ (―COMMENTS: Citizens 
United,‖ 2010).  Portions of the Court case McConnell v. FEC were also overturned in 
addition to provisions in BCRA that prohibit corporate expenditures on electioneering 
communications (―COMMENTS: Citizens United,‖ 2010).  The Citizens United ruling 
allows ―corporations and unions free to speak and spend independently of candidates 
during elections for the first time in decades‖ (―COMMENTS: Citizens United,‖ 2010).   
 The subsequent chapters will discuss the scope of the Court‘s decision as well as 
the current state of corporate speech in light of Citizens United.  The majority opinion 
and dissent will be framed in terms of free speech as liberty and free speech as equality.  
Further discussion will include current disclosure and disclaimer laws and what reform, if 
any, may come as a result of the Citizens United ruling.  
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The Majority 
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could 
silence their proposed speech.  It is the type of speech indispensable to decision making 
in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation 
rather than an individual.  The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for 
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, 
association, union, or individual. 
    -First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti  
 
 In writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy cites Justice Scalia‘s assertion from 
the case FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL) that ―Austin was a significant 
departure from ancient First Amendment principles‖ and speaking on behalf of the 
majority states that ―[w]e agree with that conclusion and hold that stare decisis does not 
compel the continued acceptance of Austin‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Adding that 
―[t]he Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and 
disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether‖ (Citizens United 
v. FEC, 2010).   
Justice Kennedy disagrees with Citizens United‘s claim that Hillary is a 
documentary ―[u]nder the standard stated in McConnell and further elaborated in WRTL, the 
film qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  
Citizens United contends that the method in which they intend to distribute Hillary, video-on-
demand, does not qualify under §441b of BCRA due to a ―lower risk of distorting the 
political process than do television ads‖ since each viewer is required to complete a series 
of steps confirming the intent to view (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice Kennedy 
contends, ―[w]hile some means of communication may be less effective than others at 
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influencing the public in different contexts, any effort by the Judiciary to decide which 
means of communications are to be preferred for the particular type of message and 
speaker would raise questions as to the courts‘ own lawful authority‖ (Citizens United v. 
FEC, 2010).   
Justice Kennedy draws concern for ―chilling protected speech‖ and cites Chief 
Justice Roberts‘s contention from WRTL that First Amendment standards ―must give the 
benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 
2010).  Justice Kennedy adds, ―the Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground 
without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the 
First Amendment‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  As a result, ―the lack of a valid basis 
for an alternative ruling requires full consideration of the continuing effect of the speech 
suppression upheld in Austin‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).   
In citing a corporations ability to create a PAC and the First Amendment concerns 
of §441b, Justice Kennedy contends that PACs are ―burdensome alternatives‖ that are 
―expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 
2010).   In regards to the Government‘s ability to regulate content of speech, Justice 
Kennedy writes that ―[t]he Government may not by these means deprive the public of the 
right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of 
consideration‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Noting that ―[t]he First Amendment 
protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 
2010).  The majority finds that there is ―no basis for the proposition that, in the context of 
political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers‖ 
citing that ―history and logic lead us to this conclusion‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).     
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Justice Kennedy discusses the issue of independent expenditure bans in United 
States v. Automobile Workers.  The Court did not address the constitutional questions of 
the case and remanded for the trial to proceed (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  The 
dissent, authored by Justice Douglas and joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
Black, argued that the Court should have addressed ―the constitutional question and that 
the ban on independent expenditures was unconstitutional‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 
2010): 
Under our Constitution it is We The People who are sovereign. The people have the final say. The 
legislators are their spokesmen. The people determine through their votes the destiny of the nation. 
It is therefore important—vitally important—that all channels of communications be open to them 
during every election, that no point of view be restrained or barred, and that the people have 
access to the views of every group in the community.     
 
 
 
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court did not address ―the 
constitutionality of the State‘s ban on corporate independent expenditures to support 
candidates‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  In Citizens United, the majority contends 
the Court addressed the issue, ―that restriction would have been unconstitutional under 
Belloti‘s central principle: that the First Amendment does not allow political speech 
restrictions based on a speaker‘s corporate identity‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  
Justice Kennedy cites the Court‘s view on the First Amendment rights of corporations as 
evidence ―when it struck down a state-law prohibition on corporate independent 
expenditures related to referenda issues (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010): 
We thus find no support in the First . . . Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the 
proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment 
loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the 
satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its business or property. . . . [That proposition] amounts 
to an impermissible legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that 
spokesmen may represent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the 
speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.  
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In Austin, Justice Kennedy states in the dissent that the case ―uph[eld] a direct 
restriction on the independent expenditure of funds for political speech for the first time 
in [this Court‘s] history‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice Kennedy contends that 
the Court bypassed prior rulings in Buckley and Belloti by identifying an antidistortion 
interest in limiting political speech (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  The majority views 
this as ―conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on 
political speech based on the speaker‘s corporate identity and a post-Austin line that 
permits them‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice Kennedy argues that the media 
exemption invalidates the antidistortion rationale (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010):  
Again by its own terms, the law exempts some corporations but covers others, even though both 
have the need or the motive to communicate their views. The exemption applies to media 
corporations owned or controlled by corporations that have diverse and substantial investments 
and participate in endeavors other than news. So even assuming the most doubtful proposition that 
a news organization has a right to speak when others do not, the exemption would allow a 
conglomerate that owns both a media business and an unrelated business to influence or control 
the media in order to advance its overall business interest. At the same time, some other 
corporation, with an identical business interest but no media outlet in its ownership structure, 
would be forbidden to speak or inform the public about the same issue. This differential treatment 
cannot be squared with the First Amendment.  
 
 In overruling Austin, the majority found that ―[n]o sufficient governmental 
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations‖ 
(Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Adding that the Court is ―further required to overrule the 
part of McConnell that upheld BCRA §203‘s extension of §441b‘s restrictions on 
corporate independent expenditures‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice Kennedy 
cites McConnell‘s reliance on the antidistortion rationale and refers to it as ―unconvincing 
and insufficient‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).   
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Free Speech as Liberty 
Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan frames the Citizens United case from the 
perspective of two concepts of freedom of speech: free speech as equality and free speech 
as liberty.  The basis of free speech as liberty centers around the notion that speech is not 
defined by the source but by the speech itself, ―[i]n this view, the Free Speech Clause 
serves the end of liberty, checking government overreaching into the private order‖ 
(Sullivan, 2010).  Since the Free Speech Clause is open to be interpreted as protecting 
speech instead of persons, the clause ―suggests that its core concern is negative rather 
than affirmative – to restrain government from ‗abridging…speech‘ rather than to protect 
‗rights‘ that require the antecedent step of identifying appropriate right holders‖ 
(Sullivan, 2010).  Under this interpretation, the clause is indifferent to who is speaking 
but ―suggests that it protects a system or process of ‗free speech,‘ not the rights of any 
determinate speakers‖ (Sullivan, 2010).      
In contrast to the redistributive qualities of free speech as equality, free speech as 
liberty suggests that ―the audience of citizen listeners is best situated to evaluate political 
speech without government intervention aimed at reshaping the dialogue of achieving 
some preferred distributional end state in which the government deems speaking power 
sufficiently diversified‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  The Citizens United majority quotes from 
Buckley v. Valeo and in essence draws a clear distinction between both concepts of free 
speech, ―[t]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment‖ (Sullivan, 2010).   
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In writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy argues against paternalism and views 
any corporate political ads, be it toxic or enlightening, are best left to the public: ―The 
Government may not…deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself 
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  Justice 
Kennedy‘s interpretation further distances the two concepts of speech on the 
Government‘s role in protecting and restricting based on content or speaker.   
Sullivan concludes her interpretation of the ruling by stating, ―the majority 
opinion and concurrences in Citizens United see freedom of speech as forbidding the 
reordering of private political speech for redistributive or paternalistic reasons, reflecting 
a fear that government intervention is a more pernicious threat to the distribution of 
speech than is any supposed vast accumulation of private capital‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  The 
perception being that the private, free market will regulate itself.        
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The Dissent 
In the dissent, Justice Stevens questions the Court‘s interpretation of campaign 
finance precedent and referred to the decision as ―a dramatic break from our past‖ and 
characterizes that majority opinion as ―rest[ing] on a faulty understanding of Austin and 
McConnell and of our campaign finance jurisprudence more generally‖ (Citizens United 
v. FEC, 2010).  Referring to the majority‘s contention that the Court was asked to 
reconsider Austin and McConnell, Justice Stevens states that it ―would be more accurate 
if rephrased to state that ‗we have asked ourselves‘ to reconsider those cases‖ (Citizens 
United v. FEC, 2010).     
In District Court, Citizens United presented a facial challenge to BCRA §203, 
later abandoning that claim and advised the Court that it was raising ―an as-applied 
challenge to the constitutionality of…BCRA §203‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  The 
distinction being that an as-applied challenge would affect Citizens United only.  Justice 
Stevens writes that ―[t]he jurisdictional statement never so much as cited Austin, the key 
case the majority today overrules‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Adding ―even in its 
merits briefing, when Citizens United injected its request to overrule Austin, it never 
sought a declaration that §203 was facially unconstitutional as to all corporations and 
unions; instead it argued only that the statute could not be applied to it because it was 
‗funded overwhelmingly by individuals‘‖ CU Opinion, 2011).   
Justice Stevens contends that the majority‘s ―unnecessary resort to a facial inquiry 
‗runs[s] contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should 
neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding 
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it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to 
which it is to be applied‘‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  The dissent refers to the 
majority‘s decision to apply a facial ruling as based in pure speculation: ―[h]ad Citizens 
United maintained a facial challenge, and thus argued that there are virtually no 
circumstances in which BCRA §203 can be applied constitutionally, the parties could 
have developed, through the normal process of litigation, a record about the actual effects 
of §203, its actual burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner of corporations and 
unions‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice Stevens adds that ―[i]n this case, the 
record is not simply incomplete or unsatisfactory; it is nonexistent‖ (Citizens United v. 
FEC, 2010).  
The majority‘s assumption is ―that a facial ruling is necessary because anything 
less would chill too much protected speech‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice 
Stevens argues that ―this claim rests on the assertion that some significant number of 
corporations have been cowed into quiescence by FEC ‗censor[ship]‘‖ (Citizens United 
v. FEC, 2010).  The dissent references the standard set in WRTL that regulation of 
corporate communication under §203 is permissible as long as it was ―susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Adding that ―[t]he Court does not explain 
how, in the span of a single election cycle, it has determined THE CHIEF JUSTICE‘s 
project to be a failure‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). 
The majority asserts that despite Citizens United dropping its facial challenge at 
the District Court level, they ―nevertheless preserved it—not as a freestanding ‗claim.‘ 
but as a potential argument in support of ‗a claim that the FEC has violated its First 
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Amendment right to free speech‘‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice Stevens 
rejects this argument (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010): 
By this novel logic, virtually any submission could be reconceptualized as ‗a claim that the 
Government has violated my rights,‘ and it would then be available to the Court to entertain any 
conceivable issue that might be relevant to that claim‘s disposition. Not only the as-applied/facial 
distinction, but the basic relationship between litigants and courts, would be upended if the latter 
had free rein to construe the former‘s claims at such high levels of generality. There would be no 
need for plaintiffs to argue their case; they could just cite the constitutional provisions they think 
relevant, and leave the rest to us.        
 
The dissent argues that the majority‘s decision to overrule Austin and McConnell 
is founded in a disagreement of the results.  Justice Stevens writes, ―[v]irtually every one 
of its arguments was made and rejected in those cases, and the majority opinion is 
essentially an amalgamation of resuscitated dissents‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  
Adding that the ―only relevant thing that has changed since Austin and McConnell is the 
composition of this Court‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice Stevens characterizes 
the ruling as ―strik[ing] at the vitas of stare decisis, ‗the means by which we ensure that 
the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible 
fashion‘ that ‗permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law 
rather than in the proclivities of individuals‘‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).   
Justice Stevens addresses the Court‘s analysis of a ―‗categorical ba[n]‘ on 
corporate speech‖ noting that the majority references a ―ban‖ on 29 of its 64 pages.  
Justice Stevens refers to this as ―highly misleading, and need[ing] to be corrected‖ 
(Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Provisions of Austin and McConnell have allowed 
corporations ―exemptions for PACs, separate segregated funds established by a 
corporation for political purposes‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice Stevens adds 
that ―[u]nder BCRA, any corporation‘s ‗stockholders and their families‘ can pool their 
resources to finance electioneering communications‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).     
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Justice Stevens states that ―[t]he Court invokes ‗ancient First Amendment 
principles,‘ and original understandings to defend today‘s ruling, yet it makes only a 
perfunctory attempt to ground its analysis in the principles or understandings of those 
who drafted and ratified the Amendment‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010). To which 
Justice Stevens adds, ―[t]o the extent that the Framers‘ views are discernible and relevant 
to the disposition of this case, they would appear to cut strongly against the majority‘s 
position‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice Stevens supports his position with a 
description of the role corporations played under the Framers (Citizens United v. FEC, 
2010):     
This is not only because the Framers and their contemporaries conceived of speech more narrowly 
than we now think of it, but also because they held very different views about the nature of the 
First Amendment right and the role of corporations in society. Those few corporations that existed 
at the founding were authorized by grant of a special legislative charter.
  
Corporate sponsors would 
petition the legislature, and the legislature, if amenable, would issue a charter that specified the 
corporation‘s powers and purposes and ‗authoritatively fixed the scope and content of corporate 
organization,‘ including ‗the internal structure of the corporation.‘  Corporations were created, 
supervised, and conceptualized as quasi-public entities, ‗designed to serve a social function for the 
state.‘  It was ‗assumed that [they] were legally privileged organizations that had to be closely 
scrutinized by the legislature because their purposes had to be made consistent with public 
welfare.‘ 
  
Justice Stevens cites Thomas Jefferson‘s concerns regarding corporations impact 
on the Republic, ―I hope we shall…crush in [its] birth the aristocracy of our monied 
corporations which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid 
defiance to the laws of our country‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Adding that ―[t]he 
Framers thus took it as a given that corporations could be comprehensively regulated in 
the service of the public welfare‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).            
 The dissent argues that the majority bases its rejection of Austin on ―[s]elected 
passages from two cases, Buckley and Bellotti‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  The 
majority references Chief Justice Roberts from Buckley that ―[t]he concept of government 
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may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative 
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 
2010).  Justice Stevens argues that the ―Constitution does, in fact, permit numerous 
‗restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a few from drowning out the 
many‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Justice Stevens questions the relevancy of the 
quote from Buckley stating that it was used in evaluating ―the ancillary governmental 
interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the 
outcome of elections‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).  Adding that ―when we made this 
statement in Buckley, we could not have been casting doubt on the restriction on 
corporate expenditures in candidate elections, which had not been challenged as ‗foreign 
to the First Amendment,‘ or for any other reason‖ (Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).        
Addressing Bellotti, Justice Stevens states that the case was ruled ―in an explicit 
limitation on the scope of its holding, that ‗our consideration of a corporation‘s right to 
speak on issues of general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite 
different context of participation in a political campaign for election to public office‖ 
(Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).   And ―[i]n the Court‘s view, Buckley and Bellotti 
decisively rejected the possibility of distinguishing corporations from natural persons in 
the 1970‘s; it just so happens that in every single case in which the Court has reviewed 
campaign finance legislation in the decades since, the majority failed to grasp this truth‖ 
(Citizens United v. FEC, 2010).   
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Free Speech as Equality 
In Professor Sullivan‘s other concept of freedom of speech, free speech as 
equality, she states that ―Free speech as equality embraces first an antidiscrimination 
principle: in upholding the speech rights of anarchists, syndicalists, communists, civil 
rights marchers, Maoist flag burners, and other marginal, dissident, or unorthodox 
speakers, the Court protects members of ideological minorities who are likely to be the 
target of the majority‘s animus or selective indifference‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  Sullivan states 
that the dissent ―relies centrally on the point that limitations on the use of general 
corporate treasuries for independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to 
political candidates are ‗viewpoint-neutral regulations based on content and identity,‘ not 
embodiments of ‗invidious discrimination or preferential treatment of a politically 
powerful group‘‖ (Sullivan, 2010).   
Justice Stevens‘ argument suggests that as long as government is not regulating 
the content of what is said but instead the speaker, the First Amendment is not abridged: 
―speech can be regulated differentially on account of the speaker‘s identity, when identity 
is understood in categorical or institutional terms‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  In defending 
Congress‘ differential treatment of corporations and ―natural persons‖ the dissenting view 
maintains that corporations are compelled to ―engage the political process in instrumental 
terms‖ as means to ―maximize shareholder value‖ in contrast to the advancement of ―any 
broader notion of the public good‖ (Sullivan, 2010).   
 The concerns of Justice Stevens‘ dissent center around the ―drowning out of 
noncorporate voices‖ by ―corporate domination of the airwaves prior to an election‖ 
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(Sullivan, 2010).  Sullivan explains Justice Stevens‘ dissent as an embodiment of free 
speech as equality: ―On this view, political equality is prior to speech: when freedom of 
speech enhances political equality, speech prevails; when speech is regulated to enhance 
political equality, however, regulation prevails‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  The idea being that 
speech by the mainstream or majority will prevail over those of the minority to a degree 
that the government needs to protect the dissenting view from political suppression.   
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Current Disclosure and Disclaimer Laws 
 In the context of current disclosure and disclaimer laws, corporate speech can be 
divided into two relevant categories: independent expenditures and electioneering 
communications.  A typical definition of independent expenditures is identified in 
Arkansas law (Winik, 2010):      
An "independent expenditure" is any expenditure which is not a contribution and: 
(A) Expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for office; 
(B) Is made without arrangement, cooperation, or consultation between any candidate or any 
authorized committee or agent of the candidate and the person making the expenditure or any 
authorized agent of that person; and 
(C) Is not made in concert with or at the request or suggestion of any candidate or any authorized 
committee or agent of the candidate. 
 
 Electioneering communication is defined by speech that references a candidate 
and is within a timeframe prior to the election.  Under federal law, electioneering 
communication must meet three standards.   It must ―refer[] to a clearly identified 
candidate for Federal office‖ and must be ―susceptible of no reasonable interpretation 
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate‖ (Winik, 2010).  It must 
also occur ―within . . . 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office 
sought by the candidate; or . . . 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a 
convention or caucus‖ (Winik, 2010).  Lastly, ―in a congressional race, it must be capable 
of being ‗received by 50,000 or more persons‘ in the relevant jurisdiction‖ (Winik, 2010).   
 Regulation is broken into disclosure and disclaimer requirements.  Speakers are 
required under disclosure regulations ―to file with the government a public accounting of 
the money they have spent to support a given candidate‖ (Winik, 2010).  Disclaimer 
regulations ―require that speakers identify themselves in their communications rather than 
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merely in filings with an agency‖ (Winik, 2010).  In contrast with disclosure regulations, 
―[d]isclaimers convey less information than disclosures – a few seconds in a television 
spot, rather than a detailed form – but they are more vivid and accessible‖ (Winik, 2010).  
 Federal law requires disclosures for ―‗[e]very person . . . who makes independent 
expenditures . . . in excess of $250 during a calendar year,‘ as well as disclosure of 
‗disbursement[s] for the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering 
communications in . . . excess of $10,000 during any calendar year‘‖ (Winik, 2010).  
Although ―disclosure is required only for express advocacy, except during the brief pre-
election window – sixty days for a general election, thirty days for a primary – when it is 
required for speech ‗susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to 
vote for or against a specific candidate‘‖ (Winick, 2010).     
In addition to federal law, ―thirty-four states require disclosure of independent 
expenditures‖ (Winik, 2010).  The states generally follow the language outlined in 
Arkansas law, ―though some do not make explicit the requirement that advocacy be 
‗express,‘ and others do not mandate that the candidate in question be ‗clearly 
identified‘‖ (Winik, 2010).  A few states ―do not use the term ‗advocacy‘ at all‖ (Winik, 
2010).   
 Federal law requires the use of disclaimers for electioneering communications as 
well as independent expenditures.  Only three states, Illinois, South Dakota, and West 
Virginia require disclaimers for both electioneering communications and independent 
expenditures (Winik, 2010).  Two states ―Louisiana and Vermont require disclaimers 
only for electioneering communications, while twelve states require disclaimers only for 
express advocacy‖ (Winik, 2010).  There are nine states that ―require disclaimers for all 
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independent advocacy regardless of whether the advocacy is ‗express‘ (Winik, 2010).  
While ―[f]ive states purport to impose a much broader disclaimer requirement, covering 
even nonadvocacy communications‖ (Winik, 2010).  Overall, ―in the vast majority of 
states, and at the federal level, electoral communications that stay outside the bounds of 
direct advocacy or the narrow strictures of electioneering communications carry no 
disclaimer requirement at all‖ (Winik, 2010).   
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Citizens Informed 
 In the context of congressional reform, little has been done since the Citizens 
United ruling.  In 2010, the United State House of Representatives passed the 
DISCLOSE Act ―[b]ut the bill died in the Senate, and even had it passed, its scope would 
have been limited to electioneering communications and express candidate advocacy or 
its functional equivalent‘ (Winik, 2010).  The DISCLOSE Act ―would have broadened 
slightly the definitions of those activities but done nothing to address the wider array of 
corporate political speech that neither ‗expressly advocat[es] the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate‘ nor ‗refers to a clearly identified candidate‘ in such a way as 
to be susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or 
against‘ that candidate‖ (Winik, 2010).  Any meaningful reform to corporate electoral 
speech should be designed to inform the public of the corporate speaker.  The disclosure 
of the corporate speaker will allow citizens the opportunity to add context to the 
advocacy they are presented with.      
In Citizens Informed, Daniel Winik discusses the importance and constitutionality 
for the ―broader disclosure and disclaimer of corporate electoral communications, 
extending to speech beyond direct advocacy‖ (Winik, 2010).  The rationale being that 
―disclosure and disclaimer requirements might actually do better than outright prohibition 
in achieving the informational and anticorruption objectives that have long been central 
to reform efforts‖ (Winik, 2010).  Winik limits the context within the confines of what 
―the Supreme Court has deemed constitutionally legitimate in this field, which notably 
do[es] not include equality‖ (Winik, 2010).   
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Any discussion of disclosure and disclaimer requirements must take note of the 
government‘s ability to regulate and whether any proposal would withstand judicial 
review in light of stare decisis.  Regarding FECA‘s disclosure requirement the Buckley 
Court found that ―compelled disclosure can always conceivably chill association or 
speech,‖ but that ―the First Amendment provides even greater protection for anonymity 
when a group or individual demonstrates a ‗reasonable probability that the compelled 
disclosure . . . will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either 
Government officials or private parties‘‖ (Winik, 2010).  Buckley identified ―three strong 
governmental interests against anonymity – informing the electorate, preventing 
corruption, and enforcing other regulations‖ (Winik, 2010).  The Court held ―that, except 
in instances of probable reprisal, the federal government‘s specific disclosure interests in 
FECA outweighed the inherent right to anonymity‖ (Winik, 2010).   
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets 
at a public meeting on a proposed school tax levy.  No mention of the author was 
included on the leaflets and Mrs. McIntyre ―was charged with violating an Ohio law 
against anonymous political publications‖ (Winik, 2010).  The Court concluded that ―in 
the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the 
name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader‘s ability to evaluate 
the document‘s message‖ (Winik, 2010).  In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg 
wrote that this case did ―not thereby hold that the State may not in other, larger 
circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity‖ 
(Winik, 2010).   
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 Recently, the Court addressed the issue of anonymity in Doe v. Reed where they 
―considered the use of Washington‘s Public Records Act to reveal the signers of petitions 
for a referendum against same-sex civil unions‖ (Winik, 2010).  Winik states that ―Doe 
does little to clarify how far the right to anonymity extends because the sort of political 
activity with which it dealt fell within the state‘s prerogative to regulate elections‖ 
(Winik, 2010).  Adding that ―Doe may be notable for its 8-1 margin, with only Justice 
Thomas writing – as in Citizens United – to defend a broad right against disclosure‖ 
(Winik, 2010).  Justice Scalia‘s concurrence in judgment called for ―an absolute mandate 
for disclosure regulations‖ (Winik, 2010).            
According to Winik, ―[t]he purpose of disclosure and disclaimer provisions is to 
facilitate the full and fair consideration of electoral advocacy after its entry into public 
discourse‖ (Winik, 2010).  Justice Holmes wrote, ―the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market‖ (Winik, 2010).  If this 
is so, ―then disclosure and disclaimer help the market to function‖ (Winik, 2010).  Winik 
cites Alexander Meiklejohn‘s theory of the First Amendment as support (Winik, 2010): 
The importance of complete information in the public sphere is central to Alexander Meiklejohn's 
theory of the First Amendment, which has profoundly influenced First Amendment jurisprudence. 
The purpose of the First Amendment, Meiklejohn writes, ―is to give to every voting member of 
the body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems with 
which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal.‖ To ensure ―that all the citizens shall, so 
far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life,‖ the First Amendment 
provides that ―no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, 
may be kept from them.‖ 
    
 A way that corporate voices are informative in the electoral process is by 
notifying citizens of policies or candidates that would have an adverse impact, in their 
estimation, on the economy and job creation.  A reasoned example of this was on display 
in the proposed advertisement at the heart of the Austin case, ―[t]he Chamber of 
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Commerce not only disclosed its corporate interests but explained, in seven paragraphs of 
reasoned prose, why its proposals (in Mr. Badstra‘s hands) would benefit all 
Michiganders by ‗making Michigan more competitive for business investment and job 
creation‖‘ (Winik, 2010).  While this is not representative of corporate political 
advocacy, it must also be considered alongside more negative or misleading advocacy.   
 Disclosure and disclaimer requirements benefit voters in the sense that ―the 
affiliation of a candidate with particular interest groups – just like the candidate‘s party 
affiliation – can be a powerful heuristic for voters‖ (Winik, 2010).  In Austin, ―[t]he very 
fact that the Chamber of Commerce endorses Richard Bandstra means something to 
voters, regardless of what the Chamber says about him‖ (Winik, 2010).  Endorsements 
are an integral part of elections and ―time-starved voters really do inform themselves by 
such basic cues as which corporation stands behind which candidate‖ (Winik, 2010).  
 An outright ban of corporate electoral advocacy would only provide a ―deceptive 
sense of insulation from corporate influence‖ (Winik, 2010).  Doing so would only 
encourage corporations to keep their influence hidden from the public.  Winik adds that 
―one of the potential benefits of a more open regime: when corporations contribute to 
public discourse through mass advertising, rather than back-channel influence, ‗all can 
judge‘ the ‗content and purpose‘ of their speech‖ (Winik, 2010).  This is not to assume 
that private discourse will not take place between corporations and politicians but ―to the 
extent that their public priorities align with those they communicate in private, the 
electorate will at least glimpse what its representatives are seeing behind closed doors‖ 
(Winik, 2010).  
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In defending the constitutionality of broader disclosure and disclaimer 
regulations, Winik describes corporations as ―inherently public entities‖ and that they 
―are public actors because they exist only through a publicly granted privilege‖ (Winik, 
2010).  A counterargument would be ―that the requirement for corporations to act 
publicly in the economic market place does not, on its own, legitimate market pressures 
on their political speech‖ (Winik, 2010).  The implication being that the corporation has 
two voices, an economic voice that is inherently public and a political voice that is 
inherently private.  This rationale would argue that corporations, like individuals, have a 
public life and a subsequent private life in which they are allowed to retreat into 
anonymity.  Winik believes that ―[c]orporations have no constitutive interest in privacy, 
just as they have no constitutive interest in speech‖ (Winik, 2010).  As stated by then-
Justice Rehnquist, ―To ascribe to [corporations] an ‗intellect‘ or ‗mind‘ for freedom of 
conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality‖ (Winik, 2010).   
 Winik states that a starting point for reform would be ―a standard that would 
cover all (l) public communications that (2) any corporation (3) funds and that (4) can 
reasonably be expected to (5) influence an election‖ (Winik, 2010).  Public 
communication ―concerns whether a regulation covers all corporate speech or only public 
speech‖ (Winik, 2010).  Any corporation speaks to whether exemptions would be 
allowed or if it would be all encompassing.  Funds ―concerns whether a regulation covers 
communications funded by corporations or only those ‗spoken‘ by corporations in the 
most immediate sense‖ (Winik, 2010).  The fourth parameter, ―can reasonably be 
expected to,‖ covers ―whether a regulation is enforced objectively or subjectively‖ 
(Winik, 2010).  Winik describes the final parameter as ―the most important‖ and defines 
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―what political communications are covered‖ (Winik, 2010).  Beyond direct advocacy, 
this is difficult to define.  As Winik states, ―legislators would court constitutional peril by 
intruding in the domain of corporate speech not tied to any electoral consequence‖ 
(Winik, 2010).       
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Sullivan’s Reform Options  
 Sullivan provides four possible political reforms that could arise from the Citizens 
United ruling: ―first, invalidating limits on political contributions directly to candidates; 
second, allowing independent electoral expenditures by nonprofit but not for profit 
corporations; third, increasing disclosure and disclaimer requirements for corporations 
making expenditures in connection with political campaigns; and fourth, conditioning 
receipt of various government benefits to corporations on their limiting political 
campaign expenditures‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  The first and fourth options would favor those 
inclined to agree with the Citizens United majority while the second option would favor 
those who side with the dissent and lastly, the third option may appeal to both sides.   
 In the first option, Sullivan suggests getting rid of hard money contribution limits 
to candidates.  To do so would be repealing federal campaign laws that stretch back to the 
―Tillman Act of 1907 that prohibit corporations from giving directly to political 
candidates from their own treasuries‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  In addition, ―Congress could 
eliminate the amount of limitations on contributions to candidate campaigns from any 
source, corporate or otherwise‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  Sullivan defends her point by 
addressing the inherent discrepancy in allowing seemingly unlimited funds directed to 
non-candidate electioneering but not directly to the candidates themselves.  By 
―[a]llowing unfettered contributions directly to candidates, who are accountable to voters, 
might also decrease the concern of free speech as equality proponents that corporate-
funded ads will be particularly toxic, debasing public dialogue and undermining a 
desirable end state of diverse political ideas‖ (Sullivan, 2010). 
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Sullivan‘s first proposal merits consideration but would ultimately struggle to 
pass muster with a skeptical electorate and a liberal Senate and president.  As campaign 
spending reaches previously unthinkable levels, candidates may soon have to defend their 
coffers to an economically struggling electorate who could resent the level of corporate 
campaign donations when their jobs are being laid off.  This point could be argued on 
both sides of the debate but given recent trends, election spending has not crested.   
Another critique of this proposal would be, ―why?‖  Why would a corporation 
give directly to a candidate when they have much more anonymity circumventing 
candidates in order to reach the same end game?  Corporations may have their agendas to 
push but they tend to favor the issue over the candidate.  It is far simpler to separate 
themselves from the shortcomings of candidates when they can retreat in their support of 
a particular issue.   
Sullivan‘s second proposal involves drawing the line between for-profit and non-
profit organizations.  Under this proposal, only non-profit organizations would benefit 
from the Citizens United ruling.  This would be a departure from the Court ruling in 
which both sides appeared unwillingly to differentiate what constitutes a corporation.  
The majority defines speech as not being limited to who the speaker is while on the 
dissent, speech is left alone to persons while excluding all corporations regardless of size, 
type or affiliation.  Based on this understanding and the opinion of the Court in Citizens 
United regarding ―chilling speech,‖ this proposal would likely face judicial scrutiny.   
The third proposal would make ―disclosure and disclaimer rules for corporate 
electoral expenditures more robust, as embodied in portions of legislative proposals like 
the eponymous DISCLOSE Act, would appear to align the libertarian and egalitarian 
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visions of free speech‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  Disclosure requirements are likely to be more 
appealing to free speech as equality advocates due to interest group monitoring that 
would serve as a deterrent to large corporations disproportionately supporting particular 
issues over others. 
 Support from free speech as liberty advocates is probable but inherently more 
complicated.  For one, ―liberty‖ proponents are against government oversight to begin 
with.  While disclosure requirements do not directly relate to oversight, it does remove 
the autonomy in which no disclosure requirements would allow corporations to push their 
agenda without reprisal.  Although, disclosure requirements may be the closest 
compromise that liberty proponents get without additional government intervention as to 
additional restrictions to corporate speech.   
 The final proposal would ―make restrictions on corporate electoral speech a 
condition of the receipt of government benefits‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  While similar 
practices are used as a safeguard against misappropriation of government funds, there are 
serious questions about this proposal.  On one side, you have ―liberals who, on free 
speech as equality grounds, dislike government‘s use of its leverage to exact conformity 
as the price of reliance upon government resources‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  While 
conservatives may view the restrictions as being, ―so burdensome as to amount to a ‗ban‘ 
on political speech‖ (Sullivan, 2010).  Given the bureaucratic nightmare such a restriction 
would cause, this proposal would likely lack a modicum of support needed to even pass 
its way out of committee.    
 
Corporate Speech in the Wake of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission          29 
 
Conclusion     
The issues addressed in Citizens United are crucial to the public due to the impact 
they have on electoral speech but also the protections granted to corporations.  The case 
provides a unique interpretation to the First Amendment whose ramifications are not 
limited to electoral speech but may extend into the commercial speech doctrine (Piety, 
2010). 
The opinion in Citizens United is replete with rhetoric identifying corporations as 
―citizens,‖ as if they were real persons. This characterization bolsters arguments for 
treating commercial speech like fully protected speech because it trains the analysis on 
the speaker instead of the listener. The majority of the Court is sympathetic to the 
argument for more protection for commercial speech and Citizens United reflects that 
sympathy. It suggests that with the proper case, there is an increased likelihood the 
Supreme Court will either do away with the commercial speech doctrine altogether and 
declare the commercial speech should be treated as fully protected speech, or it will 
nominally retain the doctrine but apply strict scrutiny review. 
 
Professor Tamara R. Piety‘s stance is that by extending First Amendment rights to 
corporations we are providing a host of legal arguments for additional freedoms, ―if a for-
profit corporation is entitled to First Amendment protection when it engages in political 
speech—speech which is in some sense peripheral to its existence—then it would seem 
full protection for its core expressive activity should follow‖ (Piety, 2010). The issue that 
Piety raises brings to light the unintended (or perhaps intended) consequences of court 
rulings. By bringing corporations into the First Amendment fold, a number of other 
protections are certain to be tested in court cases for the foreseeable future.  
The Court‘s opinion in Citizens United has stirred controversy among campaign 
finance scholars and advocates ranging from outrage to complete agreement.  The 
decision was at center stage during the 2010 State of the Union address when President 
Obama criticized the ruling and cameras caught Justice Alito verbally disagreeing with 
the president.  Instead of trying to jam the proverbial genie back into the bottle, perhaps, 
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as Daniel Winik states, legislators should ―set their sights on a different path, not only 
reinforcing disclosure and disclaimer regulations within the previously regulated sphere 
but expanding those regulations beyond direct candidate advocacy to a broader range of 
corporate political speech‖ (Winik, 2010).  Winik contends that this approach would not 
only be ―constitutionally legitimate; it also might turn out to be more effective than the 
pre-Citizens United regime in informing the electorate‖ (Winik, 2010).           
It is too soon to draw any lasting impressions from the Citizens United ruling.  As 
it stands, the ruling provides corporations the opportunity to influence elections outside 
of any significant disclosure and disclaimer requirements at an unprecedented level.  The 
full impact of Citizens United may not be felt for years to come. Much like a recession, 
you are not fully aware that it has begun until you are already in it. To truly understand 
the impact of this decision, additional research will be needed in the election cycles to 
come as well as monitoring of any legislative and judicial challenge to current disclosure 
and disclaimer laws.   
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